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Reimagining energy infrastructures for the 21st century increasingly means choosing between competing 
economic futures, a dilemma that is now provoking conflicts across many places and realms. In the 
United States, one critical clash is unfolding among tech sector advocates for a clean energy transition, as 
U.S. cleantech has worked to regroup from Silicon Valley’s failed clean energy manufacturing push of 
the late 2000s and to navigate an ongoing solar trade war with China: about what that transition might 
look like, how it might be achieved, and, critically, what economic sectors and rents might emerge from 
it. One set of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists argues that "breakthrough" clean energy technologies 
are needed to produce an energy transition and to bolster U.S. economic power into the 21st century. 
Meanwhile, a competing set prioritizes deploying existing technologies and infrastructures at scale. The 
latter argues that new kinds of innovation can accomplish this task, and in the process defend embattled 
U.S. hegemony: notably, so-called financial innovation, and new articulations between finance and high 
tech. This debate has major implications for the nature and global politics of a green economy. 
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1. Introduction 
As political factions in the United States clash over the prospect of a clean energy transition, it 
has become increasingly clear that reimagining the country’s energy infrastructures for the 21st 
century means choosing between competing national economic futures. In the U.S. context, 
worsening conflicts with embattled fossil fuel industries and regions dominate much of this 
discussion, with new populism around the demise of U.S. coal only the latest, most confused – 
and recently most significant, in the wake of the 2016 Presidential election. However, fossil fuel 
industries’ rhetorical and institutional assaults on renewables, and clean energy supporters’ own 
recent organizing successes against fossil fuels (Knuth 2017), are far from the only face of this 
struggle. In this paper, I will engage a debate that I argue has profound significance for the future 
of clean energy in the United States, the nature of the green economy that energy development 
might produce, and the shape of U.S. power within 21st century capitalism. In the late 2000s and 
early 2010s, U.S. clean energy advocates experienced a profoundly confusing phenomenon, one 
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that is still reverberating through the industry: Silicon Valley led a would-be boom in 
“cleantech” innovation and manufacturing that lapsed into an embarrassing failure, one that still 
tarnishes the sector in the minds of many. Almost simultaneously, renewables recorded a wave 
of staggering successes: the country saw a surge of solar and wind energy deployment, and a 
radical cheapening of these technologies. Through this ongoing wave of infrastructure 
development, renewables have achieved cost-competitiveness with fossil electricity sources in an 
increasing number of markets across the country. This highly disparate experience has provoked 
contrasting – and competing – visions for the future of U.S. clean energy, and a clean energy 
economy. 
 
On the one hand, as I will discuss in the first section of this paper, entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists that had backed Silicon Valley’s failed cleantech boom were profoundly 
frustrated in its wake. With new self-appointed spokespersons like Bill Gates, in the mid-2010s 
they set out in search for an explanation of what had gone so wrong – and how it might be 
remedied to advance the sector moving forward. They expressed a keen sense of opportunity lost 
for U.S. companies to develop “breakthrough” renewable energy technologies to transform the 
sector and the U.S. economy into the 21st century. Moreover, as I will explore in the second 
section, they sought governmental protection against a competitor their past experience equipped 
them poorly to fight, as China rose to become a global clean energy manufacturing leader not on 
the strength of new research breakthroughs but on the mass production and deployment of long-
mature technologies – ones that the United States had played an important role in developing, but 
had chronically neglected in deployment.  
 
On the other hand, as I will argue in the third section, a competing set of entrepreneurs 
and financiers saw in the U.S. wave of renewable energy infrastructure deployment in the 2010s 
– and the cheap imports that helped enable that boom – a major new opportunity. They maintain 
that the United States has not lost its chance for genuine clean energy breakthroughs, nor for the 
international comparative advantage and monopoly rents, private and public, these innovations 
might bring. Rather, U.S. public and private actors should reimagine (more accurately, continue 
to reimagine) what “counts” as innovation, within cleantech and full stop. They have proposed 
ways by which Silicon Valley entrepreneurs might remake cleantech in information technology’s 
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image, a “Cleantech 2.0”. Crucially, within this broader rethinking they have framed financial 
innovation, and a rising “fintech” sector, as a legitimate and necessary source of breakthroughs 
in renewable energy deployment –  arguments made before the late 2000s financial crisis for 
financial productivity, financial engineering, and U.S. financial hegemony returned in a green, 
high-tech form. 
 
With this paper, I take up a debate that has become central to the politics of energy 
transition and its articulation with green economic development in and beyond the United States, 
but that has been surprisingly neglected in critical scholarship. In the United States, questions of 
the sufficiency of energy, its basic affordability and security, have receded in domestic energy 
politics – not the case when modern clean energy technologies were developed in the 1970s. 
Instead, proponents frame renewable energy development and broader clean energy 
interventions1 as a vehicle for novel forms of innovation, economic development, and political 
economic power – would-be qualitative transformations and secular expansions within a global 
capitalist economy. This narrative has built on preexisting discourses of high-tech “disruption” 
(Knuth 2017) and rejuvenated U.S. hegemony, including decades-old arguments for a “service 
economy” and “New Economy” to be led from innovative urban-regional economies like Silicon 
Valley. As I will argue, it has simultaneously inherited, and stands to further, a longstanding 
“financialization” of these performative visions of U.S. innovativeness and sustained power 
(Krippner 2011, Christophers 2013).  
 
Theoretically and methodologically, this discussion advances new political and cultural 
economic scholarship on green economic development (and clean energy transition as a central 
project of that development), financialization, and, crucially, the deepening articulations between 
these contemporary processes (Georgeson et al. 2014, Baker 2015, Bracking 2015, Castree and 
Christophers 2015, Knuth 2016, 2017, Kennedy 2018, Langley 2018). I argue that the tech and 
infrastructure debates explored here present a distinct and significant face of broader financial 
sector interest in the green economy. I foreground both the narratives through which competing 
interests are making their case today, and the longer-term structural conditions and discourses 
that have helped shape these arguments. Particularly, I focus on a specific instantiation of today’s 
debate provoked by Bill Gates’ formation of a so-called Breakthrough Energy Coalition in the 
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lead-up to the 2015 Paris climate talks – a move that prompted critics to articulate competing 
versions of cleantech’s future. In contextualizing this contemporary debate within broader 
political economic transformations, I build upon work by geographical political and cultural 
economists (Caprotti 2012, 2015, Mulvaney 2013, 2016, Davies 2013, Knuth 2017), economic 
sociologists and innovation theorists (Block and Keller 2011, Krippner 2011, Mazzucato 2015) 
and science and technology (STS) scholars, particularly those working within the emerging 
cultural political economy of research and innovation (CPERI) (Birch 2017, Goldstein and 
Tyfield 2017). 
 
 
2. A Breakthrough Energy Coalition? U.S. “Breakthrough” Debates in the 2010s 
In the lead-up to the Paris COP21 climate meeting in 2015, Bill Gates and two dozen other tech 
and finance billionaires announced a bold investment commitment for climate change mitigation: 
they would collectively dedicate billions of their private funds to the development of 
“breakthrough” clean energy technologies, profoundly novel innovations to transform (and 
“disrupt”, e.g. Knuth 2017) energy production and use in the 21st century. Gates, who 
spearheaded the formation of this Breakthrough Energy Coalition, took a lead role in 
representing its mission (e.g., Bennet 2015, Gates 2015, Gates and Gates 2016, Pontin 2016). 
The Coalition demonstrated a faith in the power of the private sector and so-called angel 
investment long familiar from narratives of Silicon Valley’s success, as both private and public 
actors promoted its “open” model as the heart of the U.S. innovation system. Unusually, 
however, the Coalition also appealed to governments’ role in technology development – a role 
that venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and policymakers have ignored and undermined for 
decades, as the rise of neoliberal economic thought since the 1970s and its successful attack on 
the Keynesian developmental state made overt U.S. industrial policy increasingly politically 
intractable (even as “hidden” industrial policy in diverse forms continued and even intensified) 
(Peck and Tickell 2002, Block and Keller 2011, Mazzucato 2015, Goldstein and Tyfield 2017).2 
Gates and others billed the Coalition as the private sector counterpart to Mission Innovation 
(which Gates also helped coordinate), a twenty-country commitment to double national clean 
energy research and development (R&D) between 2015 and 2020. Even as the 2016 Presidential 
election raised significant questions about the U.S. government’s willingness to honor its pledge, 
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Gates and company moved ahead with their private investment vision, shortly thereafter 
announcing a $1 billion fund called Breakthrough Energy Ventures (Dolan 2016). With these 
initiatives, Gates furthered a particular vision of clean energy transition, one that he had 
advanced in various forms through the 2010s: 
We need an energy miracle…a massive amount of research into thousands of new ideas—
even ones that might sound a little crazy—if we want to get to zero emissions by the end of 
this century…Within the next 15 years…I expect the world will discover a clean energy 
breakthrough that will save our planet and power our world (Gates and Gates 2016). 
 
Although many in the U.S. business press lauded the Breakthrough Energy Coalition’s 
blend of billionaire philanthropy and enlightened investor self-interest, it has received a critical 
reception from a number of leading clean energy policy experts, entrepreneurs, and financiers 
(e.g., Dolezalek et al. 2015, Shah 2015, 2016, Liebreich 2016, Romm 2016). Many, like Romm, 
are established critics of Gates’ energy ‘miracle’ argument, similar claims advanced by entities 
like the Breakthrough Institute (and see Goldstein and Tyfield 2017), and the basic philosophy of 
energy transition that underpins these narratives.3 In focusing on basic R&D and blue-sky energy 
breakthroughs, Gates and the Coalition downplay the significance of existing renewable energy 
generation technologies – especially wind power and solar photovoltaic (PV) infrastructures now 
being deployed at scale in the United States and globally. Critics argue that this preoccupation 
with new breakthroughs erroneously dismisses existing clean energy technologies, their ongoing 
improvement, and the dramatic progress now being made in their mass production and 
deployment. In other words, it misses a breakthrough that has already happened, as key 
renewable energy technologies developed in the 20th century finally come into their own. For 
example, the well-known cleantech entrepreneur Jigar Shah argues, “we already have the 
technology to solve climate change”. He elaborates: 
The challenge with Gates's announcement is that while he and others are filling a real need, 
it is not the most pressing need…solar and wind are winning around the world not because 
of fundamental technological breakthroughs, but instead because after 30 years the banking 
sector is finally comfortable scaling up their use…we can always use more and achieve 
better. But for once we have to stop satiating the public with future talk around R&D and 
prove that [we] can do big things now. We have been training millions of people with the 
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skills necessary to deploy at scale for over 40 years. It's time to put them to work (Shah 
2015). 
 
Few of Gates’ critics deny the need for ongoing R&D on clean energy technologies. 
Some, like Romm, point to a long-term personal record advocating for increased government 
spending on it (Romm 2016).4 However, they argue that given the inherent uncertainty of 
achieving radical technological breakthroughs and the historically long periods it has taken to 
mainstream even successful energy innovations, betting heavily on new R&D now rather than 
immediate deployment of mature technologies and their infrastructures risks a catastrophic delay 
on climate action – particularly given the potential longevity of energy infrastructures once built. 
Moreover, they caution that drawing investors’ focus to R&D might divert needed funds from 
the more expensive proposition of large-scale deployment – a task that Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance estimates will require $12.1 trillion through 2040 for electric power systems alone 
(Zindler and Locklin 2016). A similar argument applies to governments, who might be tempted 
to use “technology push” R&D supports to postpone undertaking more politically challenging 
“demand pull” deployment programs. The latter include feed-in tariffs promising favorably 
priced, secure contracts for renewable energy producers; renewable portfolio standards requiring 
a certain percentage of renewables in a power pool, with or without “carve-outs” mandating set 
amounts of particular generation sources or technologies; production and investment tax credits, 
depreciation allowances, and other renewable energy subsidies effected through tax codes; and a 
range of related subsidies, protections, and quotas – as well as the more indirect support provided 
by greenhouse gas emissions caps and negative pricing.  
 
Often, those who favor deployment of existing clean energy technologies critique one of 
Gates’ core assumptions: that new breakthrough technologies are needed to make renewables 
economically competitive with established fossil fuel energy sources. They point to dramatic 
increases in wind and then solar deployment since the mid-2000s, rapidly decreasing costs for 
these systems and the energy they deliver, and the dialectical relationships among all of the 
above. For example, Romm argues that in the 2010s: 
We have seen that aggressive deployment of clean energy technology driven by government 
policies has — as was predicted — led to precisely the kind of game-changing cost-slashing 
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innovation that Gates mistakenly thinks happens primarily from basic energy research and 
development (R&D). For six years, Gates has claimed we were wildly under-investing in 
basic energy R&D. Yet, somehow the very thing Gates says he wanted — huge price drops in 
key low-carbon technologies (like renewables and efficiency) and key enabling technologies 
(like batteries for storage) — kept happening. The fact is that accelerated deployment policies 
around the world created economies of scale and brought technologies rapidly down the 
learning curve (Romm 2016).  
 
In his intervention, Michael Liebreich, former CEO of Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
(BNEF) and now chairman of its advisory board, uses BNEF data to put numbers to these trends 
(Liebreich 2016). For example, he reports $200-300+ billion a year invested in clean energy 
globally since 2008, a 50% drop in the levelized cost of onshore wind globally between 2009 and 
2015, and an 80% drop in solar PV module costs between 2008 and 2015. Pointing to 
breakthroughs’ potential for multiple phases (and causal factors), BNEF data shows that onshore 
wind and solar PV historically saw similar periods of rapidly falling costs after their initial 
introduction – from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s for wind and the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s for solar. These global average cost reductions leveled off somewhat afterward, before 
plummeting again from the mid-2000s to present as massively increased investment and 
deployment once again transform both industries (Liebreich 2016).  
 
U.S. government agencies and national labs confirm these dramatic recent trends in 
renewables deployment and costs, and expand upon what determines those prices.5 The National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) (2016) calculates that renewable energy made up 64% of 
all U.S. electricity capacity additions in 2015, and that national wind and solar electricity 
generation increased by a factor of twelve in the decade from 2005 to 2015.6  Meanwhile, the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (2015) reports drastic decreases in U.S. onshore wind and 
solar PV costs since 2008, in its case tracking whole-system costs for both utility-scale solar PV 
and distributed rooftop systems. This total adds to BNEF’s PV module prices “balance of 
system” costs (e.g., for inverters, batteries, and other hardware) and “soft” costs (for financing, 
installation labor, permitting, and a range of other infrastructure development costs). Both 
balance of system and soft costs are nationally and regionally specific, and both also historically 
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have swelled the price of solar energy, as I will discuss more below. For wind, DOE (2015) 
reports that power purchase agreements for U.S. wind systems fell from 7 cents/kilowatt-hour 
(kWh) in 2009 to approximately 2.4 cents/kWh in 2014. For solar, the DOE quantifies the drop 
in solar PV module costs reaching the U.S. market: from $3.57/watt (W) in 2008 to $0.71/W in 
2014. Factoring in non-module costs, U.S. solar systems nevertheless grew cheaper between 
2008 and 2014: for utility-scale PV, from $5.70/W to $2.34/W; for rooftop PV, from 
approximately $8.85/W to $4.17/W.7 
 
Hostility to overt industrial policy and a national mandate for renewables in the United 
States has meant that questions of “free” market competitiveness, and evaluative standards such 
as renewables’ ability to achieve electric “grid price parity” with fossil fuels, have dominated 
national renewable energy politics and breakthrough debates.8 Although U.S. renewable 
portfolio standards might require a certain percentage of all renewable energy technologies at the 
state level, and carve-outs go further in requiring that utilities procure a fixed amount of a 
particular energy resource, neither sets a price for this energy. In characteristic neoliberal 
fashion, these policies ostensibly leave such price-setting to the working of the market. 
Meanwhile, in actual practice, more and less overt, a broad range of government programs now 
subsidize renewables, while fossil fuels and nuclear energy use decades of their own far-greater 
government subsidies and supports to stack the deck against new entrants. I will argue in the next 
section that even as renewables increasingly do succeed in reaching U.S. grid parity (DOE 
2015), market price remains a locus of strategy and debate. However, this new “cheapness” is a 
product of political economy as much as raw technological potential, no matter how thoroughly 
breakthrough visions attempt to “render technical” its politics (Li 2007). 
 
 
3. Breakthrough Debates in Context: U.S. Renewables’ Turbulent History 
To contextualize today’s breakthrough debate, quests for energy breakthroughs have a long 
history in U.S. renewables development – but a mixed record. In the early 2000s, Garud and 
Karnøe (2003) advanced an important critique of the U.S. breakthrough preoccupation. They 
argued that the United States had come to favor a “linear” model of renewable energy 
innovation, prioritizing basic science research in search of fundamental breaks with existing 
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technologies. Applying this philosophy, developers seek to commercialize innovations only after 
a long period of basic research and prototyping. This approach stands in contrast to quicker 
market deployment of more modest innovations, with iterative improvement via learning-by-
doing. To cite one important success, the breakthrough model served the United States in its 
early development of solar PV (Knight 2011). Bell Labs first demonstrated the silicon solar PV 
cell in 1954 – a dramatic departure from existing electric generation methods. Then far too 
expensive for private use – especially in competition with heavily subsidized nuclear power and 
cheap oil – for the next two decades solar PV relied on U.S. government R&D for further 
development. Historians of U.S. solar show that the United States initially accomplished this task 
via a quintessentially breakthrough-oriented program, outer space exploration. The National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and corporations under government contract 
developed PV technologies for satellites and other uses, improving and cheapening them in the 
process. Since the 1970s, U.S. government laboratories and their contractors such as the NASA 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory and U.S. Department of Energy labs have conducted basic research on 
solar energy – for example, dramatically increasing PV cells’ efficiency and improving 
manufacturing processes, as well as advancing thin-film solar PV technology (Knight 2011). 
These efforts did much to establish the base technologies now used in solar PV markets and 
manufacturing today, and to support future possibilities such as thin-film solar. 
 
In contrast, the U.S.’s breakthrough model historically impeded its domestic wind power 
development, a sector in which new experimentation built upon a very old technology. In the 
midst of the 1970s energy crisis, the U.S. government, then fresh off the Apollo program and in 
search of a new grand challenge, proposed a Federal Wind Energy Program (van Est 1999, 
AWEA 2017). Through the late 1970s and early 1980s, this program, led by NASA and its 
established aerospace and electrical industry contractors (notably Boeing, General Electric, and 
Westinghouse) using National Science Foundation funding, sought to develop very large, light 
wind turbines. It targeted dramatic design breakthroughs – seemingly an easy task after U.S. 
successes with the space program. However, the initiative quickly suffered a series of 
disappointments, especially as aerospace-influenced designs failed under the high stresses of 
turbulent surface-level windflows (van Est 1999, Garud and Karnøe 2003, Mazzucato 2015). 
Meanwhile, ramping up a wind program of its own,9 Denmark adopted a radically different 
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approach: working with its domestic companies like Vestas to deploy rapidly and gradually 
improve far smaller, more “low-tech”, and, critically, more sturdy and reliable designs. Although 
the larger, higher-power output turbines originally envisioned by U.S. engineers have been 
realized today, pushing for an early breakthrough proved disastrous for the nascent U.S. wind 
manufacturing industry. In the 1980s California wind boom that inaugurated the modern 
renewable energy era, Danish turbine suppliers quickly outcompeted their U.S. counterparts. By 
the end of the boom, U.S. wind project developers like Zond overwhelmingly imported their 
turbines from Denmark (van Est 1999). U.S. wind developers have remained dependent on 
foreign imports since, sometimes overwhelmingly so (partly due to the U.S.’s long-uneven 
support for wind after it lost the 1970s-1980s manufacturing race).10 Meanwhile, capitalizing on 
its early lead in the United States and other markets (Garud and Karnøe 2003, Lewis and Wiser 
2005), Denmark’s Vestas remains the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer today. 
 
 However, the most immediate spur to Gates and company’s call for new breakthrough 
funding today is the U.S.’s failed cleantech manufacturing boom of the late 2000s, and an 
ongoing push to recharge and redirect the sector in its wake. Between 2006 and 2011, U.S. 
venture capital firms invested over $25 billion in cleantech start-ups, many focused on renewable 
energy – and lost over half their money (Gaddy et al. 2016). Silicon Valley led the charge on this 
cleantech boom and bust, inspired by various developments in the early and mid-2000s – new 
attention to climate change following the release of Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth and 
California’s passage of landmark climate change legislation; activism from prominent venture 
capitalists such as John Doerr and Vinod Khosla; the seeming prospect of high oil and energy 
prices for the foreseeable future; high-profile initial public offerings (IPOs) for several solar 
companies in the early 2000s. Moreover, in the wake of the 2001 dot.com crash, venture 
capitalists required a new boom in something to maintain the industry. Entrepreneurs founded 
cleantech start-ups around a wide range of proposed clean energy breakthroughs and disruptions, 
financed by venture capitalists eager to get a piece of a promising new sector (Knuth 2017). A 
raft of solar manufacturing companies were particularly notable entrants. Start-ups like Solyndra 
inaugurated a fresh wave of experimentation, aiming to rethink solar electric generation from the 
ground up. They targeted thin-film solar technologies, novel PV module designs, and a range of 
other fundamental innovations in the sector. Thin-film was particularly attractive in that it 
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promised to reduce the use of silicon required for traditional crystalline solar PV (silicon was 
then experiencing a shortage), reduce manufacturing energy and time requirements, and thereby 
cut costs (Mulvaney 2016, Caprotti 2017). 
 
Silicon Valley’s mood was buoyant in the mid-2000s, with venture capitalists confident 
that they could disrupt established energy technologies and infrastructures, grow a green 
economy, and reap massive profits in the process (Luce and Steel 2015, Knuth 2017). However, 
the nascent cleantech sector quickly ran into trouble. The subprime crisis hit just as many start-
ups were getting off the ground, stalling investment. The Obama Administration stepped in to 
partially fill the gap with a host of programs aimed at bolstering cleantech R&D and deployment, 
notably through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The administration’s 
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) was one particularly significant 
breakthrough R&D program – clean energy’s answer to the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) for blue-sky military research. However, despite federal loan guarantees and 
other new subsidies, the would-be cleantech boom again began to collapse. New solar start-ups 
rapidly failed en masse (including particularly politically charged failures like Solyndra, which 
filed for bankruptcy in 2011), alongside many other manufacturing-oriented cleantech 
companies. Ultimately, the major share of the approximately 150 cleantech start-ups founded in 
Silicon Valley during the 2000s failed, albeit with important survivors such as Elon Musk’s 
electric car manufacturer Tesla (Gaddy et al. 2016, Caprotti 2017). By the 2010s, most venture 
capitalists had let their 2000s-era cleantech funds lapse and turned their attention to easier and 
more profitable sectors, particularly a fresh information technology (IT) boom. In the lingering 
wake of this experience, Silicon Valley has been wary of new forays into capital-intensive 
cleantech manufacturing – with successes like Tesla so far exceptions that prove the larger rule. 
 
Solar start-ups failed in the 2000s due to a range of factors – internal flaws in their 
technologies or business models, competition from fossil fuels made newly cheap by the U.S. 
unconventionals boom, and so forth. However, the “solar trade war” that emerged between the 
China, the United States, and the European Union in this period was a key driver (Caprotti 2015, 
Mulvaney 2016). From the mid-2000s on, China has worked to become a leading player in 
global renewable energy manufacturing, destabilizing established geographies of production and 
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competition among the United States, Denmark, Germany, Japan, and other long-term leaders. 
With strong state supports, including in some cases state ownership, Chinese companies rapidly 
scaled up production of both wind turbines and solar PV modules, the latter using mature 
crystalline silicon technology rather than the experimental designs Silicon Valley start-ups were 
then attempting to introduce. The speed of this rise was staggering – China’s solar PV industry 
went from a $2 billion industry in 2007 to a $100+ billion one by 2014 (Mulvaney 2016).  
 
As new Chinese renewables manufacturers targeted both China’s booming domestic 
market and international exports, they rewrote the rules of the global industry virtually 
overnight.11 Chinese producers achieved significant economies of scale in their rapid ramp-up, 
and several quickly became globally ranked solar and wind companies (e.g., Broehl 2017, 
Colville 2017). Simultaneously, the speed of this expansion glutted the global PV module 
market. In 2012, Chinese companies produced 150% of world PV demand (Caprotti 2015). 
Between enhanced productivity and immediate market overcapacity, the global cost of solar 
modules plummeted – as demonstrated in BNEF’s numbers above. In the early 2010s, this price 
collapse overwhelmed many established PV manufacturers in both the United States and Europe, 
provoking a wave of bankruptcies. And it was a death knell for Silicon Valley’s crop of solar 
manufacturing start-ups. Meanwhile, although Chinese wind manufacturers have thus far focused 
on China’s own domestic market (Colville 2017), U.S. and European wind producers in a rapidly 
consolidating sector also increasingly brace for the entry of Chinese competitors. 
 
In this turbulent context, breakthrough activism by Bill Gates and other U.S. tech leaders 
takes on new significance. As discussed in the first section, The Breakthrough Energy Coalition 
has emphasized the need for a stronger U.S. government role in developing breakthrough 
cleantech that can compete globally (Goldstein and Tyfield 2017). This narrative cedes ground to 
arguments that U.S. venture capitalists and small start-ups alone are poorly equipped to handle 
cleantech manufacturing’s typical capital intensity and long development periods: despite its 
common self-presentation, venture capital wants its high profits on a far less patient timeline. 
Critics had pointed out these deficiencies in the U.S. innovation system for years (e.g., Block and 
Keller 2011, Hargadon and Kenney 2012, Mazzucato 2015, Knuth 2017). However, the 
aftermath of the cleantech bubble saw Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and financiers internalize this 
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argument in new ways (e.g., Luce and Steel 2015, Gaddy et al. 2016) – if for some merely as a 
justification for abandoning cleantech for less socially beneficial investments. More broadly 
significant is the way that the Coalition’s call, in admitting flaws in Silicon Valley’s innovation 
model, contradicts neoliberal orthodoxy on industrial policy (and the U.S.’s supposed lack 
thereof). 
 
Classified as industrial policy or not, the U.S. government is already pursuing steps to 
protect domestic renewables manufacturers. Both the United States and European Union have 
accused China of export “dumping”, using “unfair” state subsidies to allow its companies to 
price solar panels below the costs of production. Supporters of breakthrough solar technologies 
alleged that China’s mass production-and-deployment strategy had nipped promising innovations 
in the bud (Caprotti 2015, 2017). U.S. solar companies’ anti-dumping rationale was disingenuous 
in obvious ways, given the U.S.’s own (if less successful) subsidies.12 Nonetheless, for the last 
five years, the United States has prosecuted an ongoing solar trade dispute with China and 
Taiwan through the World Trade Organization (WTO) – with the latest iteration set to be 
decided by the Trump Administration. Tariffs of 20-55% imposed in 2012 on China’s largest 
solar cell and panel manufacturers have been undermined by subsequent legal challenges and 
practical workarounds (Chinese manufacturers moving their factories to cheaper locations in 
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam) (Cardwell 2017).  
 
 
4. From Cleantech to “Fintech”: Selling Breakthrough Financial Innovation 
The strategies discussed above reproduce a common basic argument: that a global clean energy 
transition, and U.S. economic competitiveness within that transition, both require fundamental 
technological breaks and disruptions. We must thus ask the converse question of today’s 
breakthrough debates: who in the United States is instead advocating deployment-first policies, 
and why, beyond the appeals to the common good described in the first section (what steps are 
required for timely climate change mitigation)? 
 
 
 
 14 
4.1 Cleantech 2.0: Innovation in Deployment? 
First, arguments advanced by Romm (2016) and others today suggest the deployment argument’s 
deeper roots in clean energy policy. A number of U.S. analyses have correlated successful 
renewable energy deployment programs with the development of domestic manufacturing 
industries and jobs. For example, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory researchers argued in 
the mid-2000s that: 
The dominance of Denmark as a wind industry base is waning as countries like Germany and 
Spain, with larger exploitable wind resources and with higher electricity demands, show that 
stable, supportive government policies to promote wind energy utilization can be critical to 
both creating a market for wind and initiating the rise of local manufacturers producing 
world-class turbines (Lewis and Wiser, 2005, p. 1). 
 
Most such analyses have used these economic “demand-pull” arguments to bolster calls 
for reform in the U.S. renewable energy deployment model. The U.S.’s lack of a federal 
renewable portfolio standard or other national mandate has made for an inconsistent patchwork 
of state level mandates. Moreover, although the federal government has subsidized renewables 
through the tax code for decades, the uncertainty of renewable tax credits since their inception – 
always established by Congress on a temporary basis, and frequently allowed to expire before 
being reinstated (so far) – has produced well-known boom-bust cycles in U.S. wind and solar 
development, and a general air of uncertainty. The federal government’s inconsistent support for 
renewables, and broader U.S. preoccupation with renewables’ competitiveness in a supposed free 
market, stand in contrast to Europe and East Asia’s more state planning-friendly varieties of 
renewable energy deployment. For example, in Germany’s famous feed-in tariff program in the 
2000s, central government institutions required buyers to purchase renewable energy at an 
established above-market price, one set at a level capable of supporting nascent industries and 
phased down in a planned fashion as they mature. Scholars have credited Germany’s successful 
use of feed-in tariffs as a major factor in the country’s wave of solar infrastructure deployment in 
the 2000s, and the domestic solar manufacturing industry developed out of this boom (Knight 
2011, Mazzucato 2015).  
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 While China harnessed its own domestic renewables deployment in the rise of its solar 
and wind manufacturing industries, its success at making renewable energy a global commodity 
(Mulvaney 2016) (alongside other would-be global exporters, including the United States) 
increasingly threatens this model. Renewables have gone the way of other manufacturing in an 
era of free-trade dominance: with the prospect of supportive tariffs and other state protections for 
nascent industries formally off the table under the WTO regime, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for would-be renewable manufacturers (companies and countries) to break into a 
consolidating industry. Meanwhile, countries like the United States cannot now expand their 
domestic deployment programs without raising the specter of “leakage” (Kammen 2015) – that 
in doing so they risk subsidizing the growth of foreign manufacturers as much as local ones, and 
worsening their balance of trade.13 This dilemma is the flip side of the rise of cheap renewable 
energy hardware in the 2010s, the U.S.’s related deployment boom, and policies in support of it – 
for example, the Obama Administration’s raft of deployment-oriented policies in and after the 
stimulus, and increasingly stringent RPS mandates in states such as California. 
 
 However, I argue that recent breakthrough debates are more than just policy prescriptions 
lagging this changing political economy. Rather, they exemplify a critical and growing trend in 
deployment-first discourses: attempts to frame the deployment process itself as innovative, and 
capable of generating fundamental breakthroughs. An expanding group of U.S. tech 
entrepreneurs and financiers, including several prominent critics of Gates and the Breakthrough 
Energy Coalition, are shifting established storylines around the division of innovative labor in 
the renewable energy development process. Historically, U.S. tech has imagined breakthroughs 
as an upstream phenomenon concerned with the advancement of basic technologies. Deployment 
was seen as the realm of project developers and project finance specialists – a body of practice 
aligned as much with infrastructure development and financing more generally as with 
renewable technologies per se, and not inherently “innovative”. U.S. tech interests, including 
Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, are now working to overturn this 
assumption. In so doing, they are doing organizing work within tech communities, constructing a 
performative narrative that can attract entrepreneurs and investors to new innovation and 
investment frontiers. At the same time, they are making a bid for the broader legitimacy and 
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political power that a “high-tech” designation and an imagined capacity for breakthroughs has 
historically conveyed in the U.S. context.  
 
 In the aftermath of the cleantech bubble, a group of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and 
investors sought to regroup by refocusing and reframing the sector around what Luce and Steel 
(2015) label “Cleantech 2.0”,  and what practitioners have floated various names for, such as the 
“cleanweb” and “green Internet of Things”. Advocates claim that more traditional, “capital-
light” areas of Silicon Valley and venture capital success in IT might nonetheless advance 
renewable energy development: 
Venture capital…works much better for software-centric cleantech, or the ‘cleanweb,’ which 
includes less capital-intensive technologies occupying the intersection between information 
technologies (gathering, communicating, tracking, measuring) and cleantech (Luce and 
Steel, 2015, p. 188). 
 
Some of Gates’ critics in the 2010s advance a similar vision. They highlight IT’s role in creating 
a “smart” and “digital” electric grid, one that can accommodate an influx of intermittent 
renewable energy from various U.S. regions – often far from urban load centers. Relatedly, they 
propose energy storage breakthroughs through innovative grid management (an alternative to 
batteries and other “hardware” solutions). But they also think bigger:  
Where we really need billions to be spent is on the scaling up of applications and business-
model innovations that build upon currently available clean energy technologies. Like the 
revolution in personal computing a generation ago, we’re at the dawn of the era of 
distributed intelligence in clean energy. Much of the hardware progress has been achieved. 
Now we must make it broadly available and easy to use; we need to connect and automate it 
and make it as ubiquitous and intuitive as the web and the smart phone…Energy is 
undergoing the same kind of transition that Microsoft led in the IT realm. It is moving from a 
centralized system to a distributed, networked set of consumer products and services—a 
transition critical to making these technologies globally affordable and impactful (Dolezalek 
et al. 2015). 
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4.2 “Fintech”: Financial Innovation for Clean Energy? 
Significantly, however, programs for deployment-based innovation do not stop with IT: clean 
energy finance has become a central component of this broader vision of a revitalized, redirected, 
and low capital intensity U.S. cleantech sector, in and beyond Silicon Valley. Assessments of the 
state of U.S. cleantech in the 2010s increasingly emphasize the importance of “deployment 
finance companies” (Gaddy et al. 2016). Jigar Shah’s recent critique of Gates begins to elucidate 
what this financial brand of cleantech innovation might look like: 
Construction companies [deploying cleantech infrastructure] need tremendous amounts of 
capital. The U.S. solar and wind industries alone will attract over $60 billion in project 
finance capital in 2016. Energy efficiency, battery storage, electric vehicles, waste to 
energy, and other categories add even more capital. VCs have shifted their strategy to 
support technologies that improve the returns of project finance investors. Finance Tech 
makes deploying project finance capital faster, big data tools make building management 
more effective, tracking technology allows solar technologies to generate more production, 
and so on (Shah 2016). 
 
Shah’s own entrepreneurial efforts further demonstrate a vision of this Finance Tech (“fintech”) 
for renewable energy deployment. As founder in the early 2000s of the solar project developer 
SunEdison and current president of a company called Generate Capital, Shah helped pioneer a 
business model he has variously called “solar as a service” and, more broadly, “infrastructure as 
a service”. At root, ventures using this approach promise clients no- or low-money-down 
financing for renewable energy projects. They achieve this cheap financing by experimenting 
with how renewable energy infrastructures might be legally owned (often in highly complex 
ownership structures), and what types of specially tailored financial benefits investors might 
derive from their development.  
 
Exemplifying the model, SolarCity’s solar as a service-like brand of financial innovation 
has been particularly influential within U.S. cleantech. As a rooftop solar PV installer, SolarCity 
developed a third-party leasing/financing model that it marketed to clients: the company would 
install solar panels on residential roofs but retain ownership of the equipment, financing the costs 
of the system through selling households the energy produced on their properties. The pitch was 
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that households could obtain energy more cheaply than they could by purchasing panels outright, 
and with less hassle and maintenance. SolarCity’s own benefits from this arrangement were more 
complicated. For one thing, it and installer-financiers like it were key beneficiaries of the global 
cheapening of PV modules in the 2010s – politics that aligned it against U.S. manufacturers in 
the solar trade war with China (Caprotti 2015).  
 
More controversially still, SolarCity did not make its profits only from the sale of energy 
to clients or from the increasing cheapness of its base technology. Critically, the company set up 
its leasing model in a way that allowed it to appropriate the value of new renewable energy tax 
credits set up by the Obama Administration, ones nominally intended for households’ own use. 
SolarCity acquired these tax credits from households, aggregated them, and on-sold them to 
large third-party investors searching for a legal tax shelter. In all, as one BNEF representative 
argued, “I would consider SolarCity not a solar company but a financial engineering company 
that has expertise in solar” (cited in Woody 2012). SolarCity and companies like it label (or 
euphemize) this organized appropriation of federal tax incentives as “tax-equity” financing, and 
market it as a genuine breakthrough in renewable energy development – the kind of innovation 
capable of filling the multi-trillion-dollar deployment “financing gap” that Zindler and Locklin 
(2016) quantify above.14 
 
SolarCity has hardly been alone. A wave of similar green finance/fintech companies 
sprang up in the 2010s. Like SolarCity, they promised to help fill the renewable energy financing 
gap – generate creative ways of making money from clean energy infrastructure deployment, so 
that more private investors might be drawn to the sector – and to use distinct financial sector 
expertise to solve challenges in the deployment process.  
 
4.3 Paradoxes of Green Financialization  
Paradoxically, one of the central problems that these would-be financial innovations target is 
itself a product of financialization, defined here as the (re)growth of an increasingly large, 
powerful, profitable, and complex financial sector in the neoliberal era – a process that U.S. 
policies have directly supported via strategic de- and re-regulations (see e.g., Langley 2008, 
Krippner 2011, Christophers 2013 for more extensive discussions). More specifically, modern 
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U.S. renewable energy development grew up in an era in which the recession of the welfare state 
under neoliberal ideological assault and austerity was accompanied by rising financial sector 
interest in the production and management of infrastructure as a profit-generating enterprise 
(Torrance 2008, Ashton et al. 2012, O’Neill 2013, Langley 2018).  
 
These structural transformations have shaped a central role for major financial 
institutions and finance sector profits in U.S. renewable energy development, in ways that now 
threaten the sector’s future growth. As noted above, the cost of base technologies like PV 
modules is only one factor in the price of renewable energy systems. Analysts have long noted 
that the price of U.S. renewables, especially rooftop solar and solar PV in general, is unusually 
high due to “soft” costs – particularly the costs of capital. For example, the DOE (2015) reported 
that in 2014, Germany’s rooftop PV system costs were, at $2.13/W, about half the U.S. average – 
despite the two countries’ similarly priced solar hardware (PV modules and balance of systems). 
As renewables’ base technologies rapidly become cheaper, financing represents an increasingly 
high share of systems’ costs to consumers (Feldman and Bolinger 2016) – and one that Gates-
style breakthroughs in renewable energy hardware will not directly reduce. Moreover, financial 
players’ ability to extract unusually high rents from renewable project development is not simply 
a matter of banks demanding higher fees for a risky new sector, as Shah’s comment in the first 
section implies. It also has much to do with finance’s growing ability to extract monopoly rents 
in a context of increasingly privatized infrastructure development.  
 
Utility-scale renewable energy developments in the United States have from their 
inception in the late 1970s relied upon a specialized form of infrastructure financing known as 
project finance – indeed, analysts of project finance usually date its modern rise to that 
moment,15 although in the neoliberal era the tool took off across a broad range of infrastructure 
types and geographies (Finnerty 2007, Esty 2014, Langley 2018). In project finance’s model, 
infrastructure developers create a legally separate company whose single purpose is to build 
and/or operate a large project like a solar farm or wind field. That company takes on an 
unusually high rate of debt, pledging to repay financial backers through revenue generated from 
the infrastructure itself – in selling energy and resources produced, often under a previously 
arranged contract like a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA); extracting user fees; and so on. 
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These single-purpose companies do not recycle revenue into new projects: once built, each 
functions as a passive machine for generating revenue for its backers. However, these boutique 
financing arrangements are not without their price. The usual complexity of each deal makes for 
expensive capital, one reason that project finance has typically been used only for very large 
infrastructure projects. These high costs now show up in the prices paid for U.S. renewable 
systems. 
 
Peculiarities of the U.S. renewables policy context have made project finance even more 
costly for developers. With their use of tax-equity financing for residential solar, SolarCity and 
other installer-financiers merely expanded upon a practice that utility-scale wind and solar 
developers and investors had employed for decades. The U.S. government subsidizes utility-
scale renewable projects primarily through the federal tax code: the federal Production Tax 
Credit (established in 1992, although with antecedents in the 1980s), the Investment Tax Credit 
(established in 2005), and related policies such as accelerated asset depreciation. Parent 
companies that developed the projects could in theory take these tax credits themselves. 
However, as shell companies that pass their revenue on to third party investors, they have a 
negligible tax burden. Instead, they use complex ownership arrangements to pass these tax 
shelter benefits too on to their investors – historically a small group of very large investment 
banks, insurance companies, and commercial banks capable of legally and profitably “mining” 
these tax savings (Schwabe et al. 2009, Bolinger and Feldman 2016). Investors may profit from 
tax shelter benefits far more than revenue from energy sales.  
 
In the neoliberal era, investors have pursued lucrative tax-equity financing arrangements 
in both renewable energy and other areas of U.S. urban and infrastructural development: 
affordable housing development, using Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC); community 
economic development, through New Market Tax Credits; and historic preservation, via Historic 
Tax Credits (Hackworth 2005, Deng 2013). These sectors’ shared mechanisms mean that their 
users often compete for the same tax equity investors, and renewable energy in particular has 
been dominated by handful of financial players. The pool included about twenty active 
institutions immediately before the 2008 financial collapse. In the crisis, the number shrunk to 
fewer than six – investment banks were simply not making enough profits to benefit from tax 
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equity-mining (Schwabe et al. 2009). This monopoly position has given financiers a troubling 
power to extract a high price for their capital – and did so even in the midst of the financial 
crisis, as the collapse allowed tax-equity investors still viable to charge even higher rents for 
their investment. Policymakers increasingly criticize this financing model as inefficient, costly, 
and damaging to ongoing renewable energy deployment (over and above its reliance on federal 
tax credits that may now be vulnerable) (e.g., Schwabe et al. 2009, Bolinger and Feldman 2016). 
 
Crucially, the financial sector’s ongoing power is evident in the solution many U.S. 
commentators (private and public) espouse: one that arguably further financializes cleantech and 
renewable energy infrastructure development, in that it seeks a solution in financial expertise, 
financial innovation and asset creation, and new financial markets. The Obama Administration 
initiated one temporary “fix” in the financial crisis: loosening rules so that large corporations like 
Google could get in on the tax-equity market. Subsequently, proponents have sold asset-backed 
securitization as the future of financing clean energy infrastructure – adapting practices used for 
real estate investment, including in the production of the subprime bubble, for renewable energy 
infrastructure. Via securitization, lenders can on-sell loans to third party lenders/consortia or, 
preferably, secondary markets, freeing up capital that they can sink into new loans – a churning 
and expansion of capital that could theoretically expand indefinitely if the business model works. 
Advocates like Jigar Shah (2016) aim to turn renewable energy infrastructure into a standardized 
financial asset for institutional investors like pension funds to invest in. They claim that this 
securitization can thereby dramatically cut the costs of capital, performing a type of 
financialization that advocates have typically framed (for example, in the creation of modern 
stock exchanges) as a fundamental financial innovation, and moreover a species of 
democratization: turning to a broader pool of investors to lessen the power of individual rentiers.  
 
SolarCity was once again a high-profile experimenter here. It began to issue asset-backed 
securities based upon its residential leases in 2013, and quickly expanded these issuances 
through the 2010s. However, also again it was hardly alone. Competing experiments and 
proposals include converting renewable projects into “YieldCos,” a form of publically traded 
company; tying renewable energy installation to property tax bills via Property-Assessed Clean 
Energy (PACE) loans; adapting real estate and infrastructure instruments such as real estate 
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investment trusts (REITs) and master limited partnerships for renewable energy infrastructure; 
and developing new solar-secured loans; among others (e.g., Lowder and Mendelsohn 2013, 
Feldman and Bolinger 2016). One instrument, YieldCos, already saw a major bubble in the mid-
2010s – which when it collapsed in 2015 eventually sent SunEdison, Jigar Shah’s former 
company (which remained an ambitious experimenter in fintech), into bankruptcy. 
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The U.S. cleantech debate explored here, and the broader intra-capitalist conflict that it 
expresses, remains live at the time of this writing. It is unlikely to be resolved soon. Adjudicating 
whether a clean energy transition might take shape through large-scale deployment of existing 
technologies and infrastructures – potentially with a raft of financial innovations to cut system 
costs and speed the flow of capital into the sector – or still requires fundamental technological 
disruptions and hardware breakthroughs can be performed with firm confidence only in 
hindsight. Rapid developments in areas such as energy storage today suggest the degree of 
ongoing technological flux in the sector, while global cleantech trade disputes and penalties, 
deployment frontiers, and geographies of production are themselves evolving quickly.  
 
Simultaneously, Silicon Valley’s cultural and political economies present their own 
interpretive challenges. Announcements of bold new innovation and investment futures for the 
region are always part hype – the dream, only sometimes fulfilled, that such visions can take off 
and become self-fulfilling prophesies. For example, while Bill Gates and fellow Breakthrough 
Energy Coalition tech elites announced ambitious plans for their Breakthrough Energy Ventures 
fund in 2015, the fund has been slow to materialize. Its planned size has fluctuated and decreased 
– Gates alone originally pledged to commit $2 billion of his own money, while subsequent 
pitches shrunk the fund’s total resources to $1 billion. The fund’s organization and concrete 
plans also remained nebulous for years – only two years later have details begun to trickle in on 
what technologies it might invest in. Meanwhile, this and other Silicon Valley plans confront a 
U.S. political context that remains uncertain, and most recently actively hostile. At the same 
time, new sparks of capital-intensive cleantech such as Elon Musk’s attempts to translate 
SolarCity’s success into domestic solar manufacturing demand ongoing attention – especially 
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since Tesla formally acquired SolarCity in late 2016, billing itself as a broad clean energy 
company (while taking over issuance of solar asset-backed securities, at least $485 million in 
2017). Although the merged company’s nature and future remain uncertain, it would not be the 
first Silicon Valley giant to emerge from a sea of failed competitors in a broader sectoral bust. 
 
Notwithstanding these uncertainties and indeterminacies, the unfolding debate presented 
here sheds necessary light on how seemingly novel development visions for disruptive cleantech 
breakthroughs, clean energy transition, and a green economy have been in fact shaped – and in 
key ways constrained – by established economic strategies and imaginaries. First, Gates and the 
Breakthrough Energy Coalition have doubled down on a decades-long U.S. economic and 
political strategy, one that rose with rhetoric of a New Economy in the neoliberal era: chasing 
fresh technological breakthroughs in Silicon Valley and other high-tech clusters as a way to 
defend the U.S.’s “comparative advantage” in a globalizing world. U.S. tech companies and their 
financiers have long used fresh rounds of innovation, patents, and associated intellectual property 
claims to extract globalized monopoly rents for themselves and (depending upon their global tax 
shelter strategies) for the United States – even as their production chains moved abroad to China 
and other cheap mass producers (Mazzucato 2015, Christophers 2016, Birch 2017).  
 
For decades, this vision of transnational power bolstered the U.S.’s embrace of neoliberal 
economic rhetoric and rollout of free trade policies. In this view, for policymakers and renewable 
project developers to pick mature renewable energy technologies over new U.S. innovations is a 
potential disaster for both private profits and the U.S.’s international economic position, as 
competitors increasingly dominate clean energy manufacturing, and the sector becomes ever 
more central within global economic development. However, even on its own terms the model 
has deep vulnerabilities. It demands aggressive policing of intellectual property claims in a world 
in which an ever-increasing share of global property value is immaterial and intangible. 
Moreover, it leans on emerging economies’ willingness to stay content with mass production 
rather than seizing the reins of technological innovation and international rent extraction – a 
dubious proposition where today’s China is concerned. In addition, it requires Silicon Valley and 
other U.S. public and private tech players to keep up with this treadmill of innovation: to produce 
a steady stream of disruptions and breakthroughs to maintain the U.S.’s edge.  
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Second, however, as competing entrepreneurs market new species of infrastructure 
finance as genuinely innovative cleantech for the United States, they too build on established 
U.S. economic strategy in the neoliberal era: attempts to reframe U.S. financialization and 
finance writ large as capable of innovation, and therefore potentially productive rather than 
simply extractive and parasitical (Christophers 2013). Many scholars of contemporary 
financialization have defined the process as centrally defined by its proliferation of new financial 
instruments, novel forms of valuable if intangible property based on practices such as 
securitization. In this framing, players like investment banks – or new financial start-ups – are 
not simply service providers. Rather, they are financial engineers, who use their unique expertise 
to produce innovative financial products such as asset-backed securities to sell to consumers and 
(especially) increasingly massive, consolidated institutional investors. This vision argues for 
ways in which contemporary financialization may function as a permanent secular expansion in 
capitalism rather than merely a temporary speculative period at the tail end of a genuine 
productive boom (Arrighi 2010). By extension, it works to legitimize financial specialization as a 
potentially durable source of global comparative advantage – and thus imagines a long-term 
future for U.S. financial hegemony, and U.S. financial institutions’ ability to extract and (again 
often only in theory) repatriate rents from a global economy.  
 
Without comprehensively rehearsing arguments for and against financial productivity 
here, it is important to recognize new cleantech finance as a species of this broader claim, and a 
fresh attempt to bolster it by aligning finance with high-tech. Historically, advocates drew on the 
proliferation of intangible property forms associated with the rise of Silicon Valley and the IT 
sector, and discourses of a service economy and then New Economy to help legitimize and 
codify notions of financial products and productivity (Krippner 2011, Christophers 2013) (while 
venture capital’s centrality and high expected profits within tech imaginaries presented yet 
another face of neoliberal financialization). In the wake of the financial crisis, financial 
entrepreneurs’ doubling down on these associations with the tech sector has arguably done 
similar work – beyond cleantech, new start-ups now similarly sell IT-adjacent fintech ventures 
such as Bitcoin and other blockchain technologies as fundamental innovations within capitalism. 
If successful, these arguments may reframe how the United States defines its international 
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comparative advantage in renewables development: that deployment-first policies might be seen 
to advance U.S. economic growth and power even if basic technologies like solar panels and 
wind turbines are manufactured abroad. 
 
Third, and finally, both of these competing visions for the future of U.S. clean energy 
innovation, the global green economy it might shape, and U.S. power within this economy 
contain a central silence. Even as Breakthrough Energy Coalition rhetoric flirts with a more overt 
U.S. governmental role in green industrial policy, it elides ways in which the federal government 
did, if fitfully, attempt a break with neoliberal tenets in the late 2000s. As the Obama 
Administration attempted more open industrial policy in and beyond stimulus-era supports for 
cleantech startups, it was attacked at once from the right, from actors hostile to both government 
planning and renewables full stop, and from the left for insufficient ambition and ideological and 
material commitment. At the same time, it attempted to advance a much more comprehensive 
Green Keynesian vision that, however partial and problematic in execution (Goldstein and 
Tyfield 2017), is notably absent from the models discussed here. While both programs advance 
proposals for recuperating U.S. private profits and national hegemony in a clean energy 
transition, neither has a real plan for green jobs, for the majority of the U.S. population who do 
not work in tech or finance. 
 
 As such, the models discussed here sidestep a fundamental question for the United States: 
whether the country can develop a green economy without a forceful break from neoliberal 
economic prescriptions, strategies, and hidden-at-best industrial policies – one that will be 
politically hard-fought, even as the 2016 Presidential election opened the door to new U.S. 
protectionism from the left as well as the right, and China’s green economy thrives through 
ignoring neoliberal screeds against industrial planning. As the visions explored here recast 
existing models of U.S. tech and/or financial hegemony, they continue to cede renewable energy 
manufacturing to China and other low-cost producers abroad – positioning most U.S. workers as 
consumers of clean energy technologies rather than producers of it. Breakthrough imaginaries do 
not promise “shovel-ready” manufacturing jobs and require a broader leap of faith – even if they 
do succeed in disrupting cleantech with new basic technologies, they cannot guarantee that their 
production will not simply follow other manufacturing abroad. When the question even comes 
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up for deployment-first alternatives, they typically propose low- and moderate-skill jobs in 
infrastructure construction/installation and servicing. These jobs have indeed been on the rise 
amid the U.S.’s wave of renewables deployment in the 2010s. However, like infrastructure and 
the construction sector more generally, they are subject to significant questions of job quality and 
durability – unlike renewable energy manufacturing, most infrastructure work disappears once 
construction is complete.  
 
What the embattled Green Keynesianism and related “green collar” jobs calls of the late 
2000s did get right in theory, and the debates presented here must consider, is that these more 
holistic considerations of U.S. economic interest matter politically in a context of energy 
transition. Populist political narratives in the 2016 Presidential Election contained many half-
truths and fictions around the death of U.S. coal and how to apportion blame for it (coal has 
declined due to multiple internal and external factors, notably the rise of domestic natural gas). 
However, over the longer term rising renewable energy industries do ultimately threaten to 
overturn existing fossil fuel industries, working class and professional jobs, and regional 
production economies. They are under unusually high political pressure to produce new jobs that 
might replace sectors lost. As such, specters of a largely “jobless” green economy are a major 
obstacle to a U.S. clean energy transition, even if it that development serves the narrower and 
more abstracted versions of U.S. economic self-interest discussed here. Any serious industrial 
policy for U.S. cleantech, disruptive or in deployment, must ultimately confront this fundamental 
political economic challenge. 
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1 For example, around energy efficiency, green building and retrofitting, and other interventions not 
treated in depth here (but see Knuth 2016). 
2 A trend that has shaped energy-industrial discourses and policies across many contexts; see e.g., 
Tarasova (2018).  
3 Gates’ long-term support for nuclear energy and embrace of the climate skeptic Bjørn Lomborg have 
also drawn particular fire from Romm, Shah, and others. Indeed, Mulvaney (2013) excavates a historical 
renewable energy breakthrough versus deployment debate between Lomborg and Carl Pope, former 
Chairman of the U.S. Sierra Club, that anticipates many of the tech sector arguments explored here. 
4 As Assistant Secretary at the US DOE in the mid-1990s, Romm oversaw the Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), which he argues was then the world’s largest program for low 
carbon R&D, demonstration, and deployment (Romm 2016).  
5 Again focusing primarily on onshore wind and solar PV: hydroelectric generation has operated more or 
less at capacity in the United States for decades, and other sources such as solar thermal, offshore wind, 
geothermal, and biomass were more marginal in the US context in the period discussed. 
6 According to DOE (2015), onshore wind made up 31% of all electric generating capacity added in the 
United States between 2008 and 2014 – and 46% of all new capacity added in 2015 (NREL 2016). Taking 
off later than wind, solar capacity additions leapt in the 2010s. NREL (2016) reports that in 2015, solar 
accounted for 15% of all new electric capacity added in the United States – primarily solar PV, although 
solar thermal power is also now seeing a wave of growth.  
7 In practice, rooftop PV system costs vary considerably by place within the United States depending on 
factors such as local permitting policies (Knight 2011). 
8 Although not alone. For example, wind and solar power’s intermittency, and the current state of energy 
storage technologies and techniques for managing that flux, have provoked considerable technical debate 
– especially as energy storage itself has seen rapid transformation and cost declines in the 2010s (DOE 
2015, Romm 2016). 
9 In a broader wave of development from the late 1970s that also notably included Germany and the 
Netherlands (Lewis and Wiser 2005, Mazzucato 2015). 
10 AWEA (2017) estimated 75% imported content in 2005, although in 2008 that had improved to 50%.  
11 See e.g., Gress (2015) for a broader picture of these emerging strategies. 
12 At the same time, India brought a dumping case against US solar manufacturers. 
13 Unless they implement protections such as local content rules, themselves potentially vulnerable to free 
trade challenges. 
14 See e.g., Knuth (2015), Langley (2018) for some of the diverse travels of this “financing gap” language. 
15 Project finance has other antecedents as well, in early modern capitalism and, more directly, in revenue 
bond structures pioneered in US cities at midcentury, following high-profile experiments by actors such 
as Robert Moses in New York City. Oil and resource companies similarly adapted revenue bonds for their 
own infrastructure development (Finnerty 2007, Esty 2014). 
                                                
